European regional per capita income levels may be underestimated if the positive external effects of landscape amenity benefits are omitted. This may impact β-convergence models of regional growth. Agricultural support has been used as a conditioning variable in a number of studies of European regional growth. Without correction for a possible Pigouvian subsidy, we would expect a negative relationship between agricultural support and regional growth. If agricultural support is intended to act as a Pigouvian subsidy aiming at internalising landscape amenity benefit, we would expect to see upward shifts in coefficient values and possibly a sign change. Because landscape amenity benefits cannot be readily measured, we will be obliged to explore the parameter space of models including such a correction, in particular to see whether positive coefficient values for agricultural support can be found for representations of amenity benefit that harmonise with economic theory.
Introduction
Agriculture is a heavily supported industry in most developed countries and this support is widely perceived as a hindrance to economic growth and development and a major source of distortion of international trade. It has become one of the main focuses of OECD and has been at the centre of the ongoing and the last round in WTO.
Agricultural policy could be expected to interact with economic growth in two ways. Firstly, one could expect the proportion of subsidised agriculture in a regional economy, and the intensity of the support, to influence the region's growth rate negatively. The reasons for these negative relationships are that subsidies attenuate the movement of labour and capital to other sectors (and/or regions) with higher returns, conserving structures of factor allocation at the cost of those paying for the subsidies. The subsidies may also be expected to reduce or to distort incentives to farmers to change their mixes of products and/or methods of production. In this sense, the subsidies are counterproductive as they hamper growth in GVA. Brunstad (2003, 2006) , investigating convergence in economic growth in Western Europe, find some empirical support for this view.
The recent discussion about the so-called multifunctionality of agriculture may, however, indicate that agricultural activities produce benefits over and above the market value of agricultural production. For recent papers addressing this question, see Peterson, Boisvert and de Gorter (2002) and Vårdal (1999, 2005) . In terms of Pigouvian welfare economics, agricultural production may have positive external effects on perceived public goods like the amenity value of the cultural landscape. See for instance Drake (1992) . If this is the case, and if agricultural support is used as Pigouvian subsidies to internalize these externalities, growth is reduced only because we are measuring the wrong thing, traditional GVA instead of an extended GVA including the value of such amenities. Whether this is the case or not is of course of vital importance for the policy implications of a negative relation between agricultural support and regional growth.
Partly, this amenity may come as a positive externality to other industries, in this case mainly tourism. The link between agriculture and tourism in this respect have been pointed out by several authors, see for instance Pruckner (1995) . If this is the case, the amenity will be included in GVA as part of GVA in tourism. However, to the extent that this amenity is a public good affecting the local population, it is not included in GVA even if it contributes positively to welfare.
Convergence and agricultural support
In the Solow growth model, an economy, irrespective of the starting point, will converge asymptotically along the solid curve to a steady state growth path like the heavy dotted line in panel a of Figure 1 , the slope of which would be the rate of growth of total productivity. Comparing at a certain point of time a set of regions with identical production functions, rates of exogenous population growth and rates of time preference 1 , regions would differ in the level and the rate of growth in per capita production only because they had different starting points due to different histories and exogenous shocks, and one would observe a negative relation between their rate of growth of per capita production and its level. See for instance Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) . The steady state growth path will be determined by the condition, f (k * ) = δ + ρ+θx, the so called golden rule of accumulation, where δ is the rate of depreciation, ρ the rate of time preference, θ the elasticity of marginal utility, and x the rate of growth of total factor productivity (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992 , page 225).
1 The reference here is to the so-called Koopmans/Cass formulation of the neoclassical growth model. Alternatively, one could use the Solow/Swan formulation in which case there would be an exogenous savings rate Assume now that the product is an aggregate of an agricultural and a manufacturing good, and that the production functions for the two goods are identical. Suppose further that in the regions agriculture is subsidized to varying degrees. Unless the subsidies compensate for market imperfections (Pigouvian subsidies) they will lead to overinvestment in agriculture and underinvestment in manufacturing; see Figure 2 . The regions where agriculture is subsidized would then converge to a dynamically inefficient steady state growth path like the thin dotted line in panel a of Figure 1.
Figure 2: Dynamic inefficiency
The degree of dynamic inefficiency, that is, the difference,k * −k 1 , will increase with the level of subsidies. In terms of Figure 1 , panel a, point A could be lower than point C, either because it is not yet in steady state, in which case the growth rate would be higher than in C, or it could be in a dynamically inefficient steady state due to agricultural support, in which case the growth rate would be the same as in C. Regressing ∆ log y on log y would then probably either be insignificant or having the wrong sign, while conditioning on a measure of per capita agricultural support would give the coefficient of log y the expected negative sign and the expected sign of the coefficient of the support variable would be negative.
The situation would be different if the subsidies were compensating for market inefficiencies. Assume for example that subsidies to agriculture take the form of paying farmers for a positive externality on other industries, like for instance tourism. If no subsidies were paid there would be underinvestment in both industries and the steady state growth path would be too low, whereas regions with high subsidies to agriculture would have a higher steady state growth path. Conditioning on a measure of per capita agricultural support would then have an expected positive sign of the coefficient of the support variable.
The current debate of the multifunctionality of agriculture amounts, when stated in terms of classical welfare economics, to an assertion that agriculture does indeed give rise to positive externalities in which case a positive sign might be expected for the support variable. However, most of the examples of multifunctional effects that are mentioned in the literature like for instance amenity benefits, have the character of public goods that by definition are not sold in a market and are therefore not accounted for in traditional measures of production. A third outcome is therefore possible. The support variable comes out with a negative sign, but that is due to the fact that we are measuring the wrong thing, traditional GDP or GVA, instead of an extended production measure including the value of the public good.
Estimating convergence with additional variables
In empirical studies following the tradition of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) , β-convergence is represented in the following way:
where θ is a coefficient, α is a constant intercept, and u i is an independent and identically distributed disturbance term. Given an estimate of θ, the speed of convergence may be represented as: β = − log(1 + T θ)/T , with 100β expressing this speed in percentage points (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992, p. 230) .
In Bivand and Brunstad (2003) , our immediate concern was to relate agricultural variables to growth, after taking initial GVA per capita into account. In Bivand and Brunstad (2006) we also investigated the possibility that other variables with a similar spatial pattern may be at least as important as agricultural policy in helping explain regional growth rates.
Allowing for differences in steady state across regions, conditional β-convergence can be represented in the following way:
where δ is a vector of coefficients and x i is a vector of variables controlling for differences across regions. In our case, these variables will include a dummy for Greek regions (shifting the intercept), a human capital variable, and an agricultural support variable.
Regional GVA figures
The data used for EU NUTS 2 gross value added for 1989 and 1999 were extracted from Cambridge Econometrics' European Regional Databank, and are measured in million 1990 ECU and 1000 persons. The start and finish years were chosen in the earlier paper (Bivand and Brunstad, 2003) to accommodate available agricultural data, for which major breaks in series occurred when revisions of the System of National Accounts, knocked on to EAA 97, the European system of agricultural accounts. Because the data source we are now using to measure agricultural policy impacts is also available for Greece, we have extended our regional coverage here, but still do not include Denmark, Ireland, UK, Berlin and former East Germany, or overseas dependencies and Atlantic islands. Our agricultural policy data source also aggregates NUTS 2 regions to NUTS 1 in Belgium, Netherlands and Germany, leaving us with 93 units of observation, partly at NUTS 1 and partly at NUTS 2.
Human capital
Human capital was operationalised by using Eurostat tables for the percentage of the active population by NUTS 2 region constituting human resources in science and technology (HRST) in 1996. We are aware that 1996 is very late in our period, but earlier data with sufficient regional coverage have not been identified. The HRST definition is persons who successfully completed education at the third level in a S&T field of study, or not formally qualified as above but employed in a S&T occupation where the above qualifications are normally required 2 . We would expect regions with relatively higher levels of human capital defined in this way to experience higher rates of growth. The human capital variable hc96 varies considerably between regions; in order to reduce numerical problems, the variable has been rescaled to thousands of HRST persons per 10,000 active.
Agricultural support
Although not ideal, some estimates of producer subsidy equivalents for agricultural policy support have been made available in a report prepared for the European Commission prior to the completion of the second cohesion report 3 . Although the report mentions numerous difficulties in collating a usable data set, including non-reporting by many countries, and non-reporting at the NUTS 2 level by others, which is why we have been forced to aggregate NUTS 2 regions to NUTS 1 in Belgium, Netherlands, and Germany, we have chosen to use the data denoted "composition of total transfers to the agricultural sector -price support plus direct and other payments," ECU millions in the report, here tottrpc96. These are among the more complete, and give for 1996 a value per capita transfer value. As with the human capital variable, we are assuming that the 1996 values are highly correlated with the start of period values we would have preferred to use. In Bivand and Brunstad (2006) we used agricultural support per capita net of the regions' contributions to CAP, but feel that in the present case, it is more appropriate to use gross support. As we argued in Section 2, we expect the level of agricultural policy support to be negatively related to regional growth, because higher levels of support are likely to slow the reallocation of labour and capital to non-agricultural sectors. We feel that using per capita values is not unreasonable in the present context, but continue to be aware that changes in CAP during the study period, and the fact that support levels for Greece, Spain and Portugal ramped up during our chosen period, may weaken any substantive conclusions we may reach.
A dummy for Greek regions
Among others, Boldrin and Canova (2001) note that artefacts may be introduced into comparative series by deflators for price levels and/or exchange rates. The Cambridge Econometrics data for GVA used here are converted to ECU/Euro using tables from International Financial Statistics Yearbook published by the IMF (Sasha Thomas, personal communication, 2002) . So regions in countries with unusual exchange rate series will appear to perform differently from regions in countries with typical exchange rate series. We show in Bivand and Brunstad (2006) that the performance of Greek regions may be an artefact of the conversion of Drachma GVA values to ECU/Euro.
Base model
As we argued above, we expect the level of agricultural policy support to be negatively related to regional growth, because higher levels of support are likely to slow the reallocation of labour and capital to non-agricultural sectors. Our earlier work found that a spatial lag specification was marginally better than OLS:
This model was fitted by Maximum Likelihood using functions in the spdep contributed package to R (R Development Core Team, 2006) , and weights derived from a Gabriel graph of region centroids. Table 1 gives the results of this regression, which differ from Table 9 , columns 1 and 2 in Bivand and Brunstad (2006, p. 292) only in the operationalisation here of agricultural support as gross rather than net support per capita. The agricultural support variable has the expected sign, even if it is only marginally significant. Although it is a borderline case, we feel that it does add extra information to account for differences in regional growth. Regions with lower transfers to agriculture experience slightly faster growth than regions with larger transfers, even when differences in human capital are taken into account.
We will also be reporting the NagelkerkeR 2 (Nagelkerke, 1991) , a generalised coefficient of determination, to allow us to compare model fits in which we have modified the left hand side:
where l 1 is the ML model fitted log likelihood and l 0 is the null model log likelihood, that is the value of a linear model ofỹ fitted with only an intercept for current values of B, ε 1 , ε 2 and ε 3 .
Dealing with the multifunctionality aspect
One way of dealing with the problem of an omitted multifunctionality aspect is to try to correct the GVA figures to include the landscape amenity benefits. Several studies have attempted to estimate the willingness to pay for the amenity value of the cultural landscape. Lopez, Shah and Altobello (1994) , using data from Beasley et al. (1986) and Foster, Halstead and Stevens (1982) , have calibrated the following willingness to pay function for the amenity value of the agricultural landscape:
where L is a quantity index for landscape amenity, here assumed equal to cultivated area, P is population, y is income per capita, and B is a scaling parameter. From economic theory one would expect the marginal willingness to pay for the landscape amenity to be diminishing, implying that 0 < ε 1 < 1, and also that the willingness to pay should be income elastic, meaning that ε 3 > 1. Furthermore, if the landscape amenity were a pure public good, like the famous lighthouse example, ε 2 = 1, implying that the per capita willingness to pay is independent of population size.
In fact the elasticities were calibrated to: ε 1 = 0.172 -marginal willingness to pay for the landscape amenity is strongly diminishing; ε 2 = 0.796 -landscape amenity is close to a pure public good, but some crowding effect is present, and ε 3 = 3.877 -landscape amenity is highly income sensitive.
Even if the empirical foundation of these estimates is extremely meagre, amounting to four observations from US counties, they are within the ballpark of "acceptable" figures, albeit the income elasticity may seem unreasonably high. Assuming that a perfect market existed for this amenity, it would have been sold at a price equal to marginal WTP and the contribution to GVA at market prices would be:
Corrected GVA per capita would then be:
If we knew all the parameters and had data for L and P, we could substituteỹ in (6) for y in (1), and perform the convergence analysis with the corrected values. However, even if we attach some credibility to the estimated elasticities, we feel much more uncertain about the scaling parameter. This value depends crucially on the units of measurement and we do not have any theoretical underpinnings for what would be a reasonable range. In the absence of a credible estimate of the scaling parameter, adjusted GVA cannot be calculated from observed data. Substitutingỹ in (6) for y in (1), and using the approximation log(1 + x) ≈ x, which is valid for x less than 0.1, we get:
where
i,T , and γ = θδ = θε 1 B. However, trying to estimate B from (7) along with α and θ, would run into to serious endogeneity and colinearity problems.
Instead, we will correct the y values in (1) using (6) running several regressions increasing B stepwise from 0 (no correction) to the highest conceivable figure, which we somewhat arbitrarily put as the number making the ninth decile of the correction term approximately equal to 20%, using a scaling function φ:
and letting B vary between zero and unity to manipulate the strength of the amenity benefit.
Correcting GVA for amenity value
We now substituteỹ for the y values in (3). We use the calibrated coefficients of (4) from Lopez, Shah and Altobello (1994) to calculate the correction factor in (6). This correction factor is then pre-multiplied by a scaling factor, such that the ninth decile of the combined 1989 and 1999 correction factors is less than 20%, taken over the set of regions. The GVA per capita and population variables were available in our existing data set, and were supplemented by agricultural land areas for 1989 and 1999 from A2LAND (Eurostat online). Letting our manipulation variable B to run from zero to unity, we allow the correction to vary from absence to the full effect anticipated here. For B equal to zero, the regression is identical to the one reported in Table 1 . The results of coefficient estimation are shown in Table 2 for a sequence of values of B. We see that θ drops with increasing correction but the coefficient remains negative. The coefficients of the conditioning variables, human capital, agricultural support and the Greek dummy hardly change, and ρ declines slowly.
As is seen from Figure 3 , the fit of the model measured by the NagelkerkeR 2 uniformly drops with increasing correction. One might conclude that the attempts at correcting for amenity benefits do not lend any support to the hypothesis that agricultural support in Europe works as Pigouvian subsidies. However, using the income elasticy from Lopez, Shah and Altobello (1994) , results in a correction term that is completely dominated by variation in GVA per capita, as can be seen from Figure 4 . Even if the willingness to pay for landscape amenity might be considered a luxury good and therefore should be expected to be income elastic, an income elasticity of close to four may still seem unreasonably high. 
Exploring ε space
If we have prior beliefs about the values of B and the ε parameters, then we should use these in exploring the possible calibration space of the willingness to pay correction factor. We have indicated that the only available empirical calibration does not, in our opinion, seem to yield satisfactory results. Since the calibrations made by Lopez, Shah and Altobello (1994) are based on a small amount of North American data, for spatial units of a rather different scale than the European regions, exploring ε space is necessary.
Numerical optimisation
One approach is to fix B and to try to force the coefficient in the base model(3) for agricultural support (log(tottrpc96)) into positive territory by using numerical optimisation to search ε space. Two values of B were chosen, 0.6 and 1.0, an unconstrained optimisation method (simulated annealing -SA), and a constrained optimisation method with box constraints on a quasi-Newton method with two sets of constraints. The objective function to be maximised is simply the value of the coefficient on the agricultural support variable fitted using a spatial lag model for GVA values corrected using the B value given and the ε values. The ε values in the two constrained optimisation cases were all constrained to lie within [−20, 20] in the first case (Constr 1), and ε 1 , ε 2 ∈ [0, 1], and ε 3 ∈ [−20, 20] in the second case (Constr 2). Starting values were (0.5, 0.5, 2.5) in all cases. If the coefficient of the agricultural support variable can take positive values for plausible ε values and without the model loosing too much explanatory power, then we could conclude that we have found some support for the functioning of agricultural support as a Pigouvian subsidy. The simulated annealing optimisation was run for a fixed number of 10000 iterations; the constrained optimisations only converged for the second case (Constr 2) under default control parameters. For B = 0.6, Table 3 shows that both simulated annealing (SA) and wide constraints on ε values (Constr 1) yield implausible values in the light of economic theory. With tighter constraints on ε 1 and ε 2 (Constr 2), the coefficient of the agricultural support variable also has a positive sign, but a very small absolute value, and would have become insignificant if significance tests had meaning in this context. For B = 1.0, the conclusion is similar, with implausible values for ε in the unconstrained and only broadly constrained cases. In the tighly constrained case, the sign of the agricultural support variable coefficient is again positive, but with a very small absolute value; convergence was achieved with all the ε values on their upper bounds. Positive values of the agricultural support coefficient have been reached, but for values of ε which economic theory does not admit, and with highly unusual values of the remaining coefficients.
Gridding the ε space
Since automatic searching for a combination of calibration parameters that both yield a positive impact of agricultural support seen as a Pigouvian subsidy on regional economic growth has evidently failed, we turn to a brute force tabulation of models fitted using parameters within bounds suggested by economic theory. We fit spatial lag models for all combinations of ε 1 = 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1.0, ε 2 = 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1.0, ε 3 = 1.2, 1.4, . . . , 4.0, and B = 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1.0. This gives a four-dimensional space for each of the coefficients and measures of interest, which we visualise using conditioning plots for panels with varying values of one dimension showing a surface on the dimensions, holding the fourth dimension constant. The vertical bar in the strip above each panel encodes the value of the conditioning dimension. In Figure 5 , we show the values taken by NagelkerkeR 2 for the conditioning dimension B and fixed ε 2 = 0.8, varying over ε 1 and ε 3 in each panel. The panels also show contour lines, and two points. The dot is the set of calibrated parameters due to Lopez, Shah and Altobello (1994) , while the cross marks our preference for a much lower value of ε 3 , and a much higher value of ε 1 . Our preference is driven partly by feeling the calibrated income elasticity as being very high, and the contribution of agricultural land to amenity benefits as being too modest, in the calibrated parameters. Examining the conditioning plots shows that goodness-of-fit declines sharply in the location in parameter space of the calibrated parameters for this data set, both moving across values of conditioning dimension B, and ε 2 for B = 0.6 in Figure 6 . We take this as indicating that a willingness to pay correction to GVA can be introduced into this conditional β-convergence model without loss of fit quality if we shift ε 1 rightwards and ε 3 downwards, for moderately large ε 2 and across all values of B. Since we would expect that taking amenity benefit into account should dampen the negative impact of agricultural support on regional economic growth, we feel more comfortable with a rightward shift of ε 1 and a downward shift of ε 3 . The agricultural support coefficient takes values closest to positive territory for large ε 1 , small ε 2 , large ε 3 , and large B, but as we saw above, these parameter values are associated with reduced goodness-of-fit.
To conclude, Table 4 shows the coefficient values estimated if we choose our prefered location in parameter space of B = 0.6, ε 1 = 0.8, ε 2 = 0.8, and ε 3 = 2.2, based on examination of conditioning plots. There are three changes from the base model results shown in Table 1 . The value of the agricultural support coefficient has changed; while the sign is still negative, its absolute value has halved, and had a significance test had any meaning in this context, it would have ceased to be significant. This does not, however, mean that agricultural support can be seen as a Pigouvian subsidy as such -for that we would expect to see a positive and significant coefficient estimate. It does allow us to conclude that when GVA is adjusted for landscape amenity benefit, the negative impact of agricultural support on regional economic growth seems to be moderated. Beyond this, the value coefficient estimate for the human capital variable has tripled, and the spatial lag autoregressive coefficient estimate is a little larger. 
Concluding remarks
In line with Brunstad (2003, 2006) , we have found some empirical support from European regional data that agricultural support has a negative impact on economic growth. However, the policy implications of this finding are not clear. If the proponents of the so called multifunctionality aspect of agriculture are right, agriculture gives rise to positive externalities on public goods, the value of which are not captured in regional and national GVA data. In that case, the fact that growth in measured GVA per capita is slowed down by support to agriculture, is no proof that growth in "true" GVA, including the value of these public goods, would also be slowed down. On the contrary, if agricultural support in reality were performing like Pigouvian subsidies, the opposite should be true. In this paper we have focused on that question. The best documented public good connected with agricultural activity seems to be the amenity value of the cultural landscape. Borrowing a willingness to pay function from an American study by Lopez, Shah and Altobello (1994) , we have tried to rerun our main regression from Bivand and Brunstad (2006) with corrected GVA figures. Using the original elasticities from Lopez, Shah and Altobello (1994) and varying the scale factor, we found that the coefficient of our agricultural support variable remained negative. In fact its value hardly changed at all. However, the overall fit of the regression, measured by the NagelkerkeR 2 , became slightly weaker with increasing scale parameter in the correction function. For higher income and land elasticities in the willingness to pay function than those estimated by Lopez, Shah and Altobello (1994) , the coefficient may fall with increasing correction, but it still remains negative.
When we tried to find positive values of the agricultural support coefficient, we reached parameter values for the elasticities that are implausible in economic theory, and with deterioration in goodness of fit. On visualising all of the model fits for a grid of scaling factor and elasticity values within the ranges that economic theory would suggest, we felt that the Lopez, Shah and Altobello (1994) values lie in an improbable part of parameter space for our data. We proceeded to increase land elasticity and reduce income elasticity, and found plausible results with goodnessof-fit equivalent to that of the unadjusted model, and with the impact of adjusting GVA only shifting the agricultural support coefficient. So we can perhaps conclude that when GVA is adjusted for landscape amenity benefit, the negative impact of agricultural support on regional economic growth seems to be moderated.
On balance, trying to correct the GVA data for possible unobserved amenity benefits from agriculture does not give much support to the notion that the agricultural regimes in place in Europe in the 1990's may have functioned like Pigouvian subsidies. Of course, in an ideal world there would be empirical data permitting the amenity benefit adjustment to be estimated directly, but it does not seem to us likely that empirically based elasticities would end up far from our prefered location (a Bayesian comes out of the cupboard?).
